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Introduction 
 
“If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.” 
--Isaac Newton, 16th Century 
 
Even this saying itself is a variant of a similar statement attributed to Bernard of 
Chartres in the 12th Century, and inspired the title for a book by Steven Hawking and an 
album by Oasis. Creative ideas beget other creative ideas and, as a result, modifications 
accumulate, and we see an overall increase in the complexity of cultural novelty over 
time, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as the ratchet effect (Tomasello, Kruger, & 
Ratner, 1993). Although we may never meet the people or objects that creatively 
influence us, by assimilating what we encounter around us and bringing to bear our own 
insights and perspectives, we all contribute in our own way, however small, to a second 
evolutionary process – the evolution of culture.  
This chapter explores how we can better understand culture by understanding the 
creative processes that fuel it, and better understand creativity by examining it from its 
cultural context. First, we look at some theoretical frameworks for how culture evolves 
and what these frameworks imply for the role of creativity. Then we will see how 
questions about the relationship between creativity and cultural evolution have been 
addressed using an agent-based model. We will also discuss studies of how creative 
outputs are influenced, in perhaps unexpected ways, by other ideas and individuals, and 
how individual creative styles “peek through” cultural outputs in different domains.  
A Scientific Framework for Cultural Evolution 
Darwin vastly enhanced our understanding of the organismal world by integrating 
scattered biological knowledge into an evolutionary framework, enabling us to see how 
species fit together in a unified “tree of life”. His feat even improved our ability to make 
predictions about what kinds of underlying mechanisms were at work and what traits or 
species we might expect in particular environments. Since art, technology, languages, and 
customs change over time in a manner seemingly reminiscent of biological evolution, it 
seemed reasonable to view culture as a second evolutionary process. This section gives a 
brief overview of two theories of cultural evolution and discusses what these theories 
imply for our understanding of creativity.  
Cultural Evolution as a Selectionist Process 
Biological evolutionary processes can be seen as consisting of two components: the 
generation of new variants, and the differential survival or selection of some of those 
variants, such that they live long enough to produce offspring. Darwin’s explanation 
focused not on the generation of variants but on the selection of some fraction of them, 
which is why it is sometimes referred to as a selectionist theory. He posited that 
biological change is due to the effect of differential selection on the distribution of 
heritable variation in a population; those with adaptive traits live longer, have more 
offspring, and are ‘selected’ for, and therefore, their traits proliferate in future 
generations. Thus, a selectionist process works through competitive exclusion amongst 
existing variants; it is not a mechanism that affects how variants are generated in the first 
place. In fact, it assumes that variants are generated randomly, for to the extent that 
variation is not randomly generated, the distribution of variants reflects whatever was 
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biasing the generation away from random in the first place, not survival of the fittest. 
Notice also that the theory operates on the timescale of generations, as it requires at a 
minimum an entire generation for change to occur.  
The reason a selectionist explanation is applicable in biology is that in biological 
evolution there are two kinds of traits: (1) inherited traits (e.g., blood type or eye color), 
which are transmitted vertically from parent to offspring by way of the genes, and (2) 
acquired traits (e.g., a tattoo, or knowledge of someone’s name), which are obtained 
during an individual’s lifetime, and which are sometimes called epigenetic because they 
are not transmitted vertically through the genes. Since acquired traits are not passed down 
(e.g., you do not inherit your mother’s tattoo), the fast intra-generational transmission of 
acquired traits does not drown out the slow, intergenerational transmission of inherited 
traits. In other words, a Darwinian explanation works when acquired change is negligible 
relative to inherited change; otherwise the first, which can operate over minutes, 
overwhelms the second, which requires generations.  
Attempts to develop a scientific framework for cultural evolution initially framed it 
as a selectionist process (Aunger, 2000; Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Gabora, 1996). 
However, this was difficult to reconcile with the highly cooperative nature of human 
societies and, when examined closely, the selectionist theory is incompatible with some 
basic facts about how culture evolves (Fracchia & Lewontin, 1999; Gabora, 2004, 2011, 
2013, Gabora & Kauffman, in press; Temkin & Eldredge, 2007). In cultural evolution 
there is no mechanism for discarding acquired change (e.g., once one cup had a handle, 
all cups could have handles). Therefore, acquired change accumulates orders of 
magnitude faster than, and overwhelms, change due to the mechanism Darwin proposed: 
differential replication of variants in response to selection. Moreover, to the extent that 
the generation of novelty deviates from random chance, change is due to whatever is 
causing that deviation in the first place rather than to selection of fitter variants. In short, 
cultural change is acquired, not inherited, and it is generated not randomly, but through 
strategy and intuition. Therefore, a Darwinian theory of cultural evolution has been found 
to be inappropriate (Gabora, 2004, 2008a, 2011, 2013; Gabora & Kauffman, in press).  
Cultural Evolution as a Communal Exchange Process 
This analysis prohibits a selectionist, but not an evolutionary, framework for 
culture. Even in the biological realm we are only just starting to appreciate the key role 
played by non-Darwinian epigenetic processes (Kauffman, 1993; Koonin, 2009; Koonin 
& Wolf, 2012; Lynch, 2007; Woese, 2002; Woese, Goldenfeld, & 2009). Research on the 
origin of life suggests that early life consisted of autocatalytic protocells that evolved 
through a non-Darwinian process of communal exchange, and that natural selection 
emerged later from this more haphazard, ancestral evolutionary process (e.g., Gabora, 
2006; Segre, 2000; Vetsigian, Woese, & Goldenfeld, 2006; Wächtershäuser, 1997). 
Communal exchange is more haphazard than selection and does not require a self-
assembly code (such as the genetic code). What it requires is structure that is (1) self-
organizing: its components generate new components through their interactions, (2) self-
replicating: through duplication of components it can reconstitute an entity like itself, and 
(3) interactive: entities exchange components. Table 1 provides a summary of the 
similarities and differences between natural selection and communal exchange. Both have 
mechanisms for preserving continuity and for introducing novelty. However, whereas 
natural selection is a high fidelity Darwinian process and the structure that self-replicates 
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is DNA-based self-assembly instructions, communal exchange is a low fidelity 
Lamarckian process, and the structure that replicates is an autopoietic network. Only 
communal exchange allows transmission of acquired traits. Communal exchange is the 
proposed mechanism by which early life evolved, as well as the mechanism by which 
culture evolves, and some aspects of present day life, such as horizontal gene transfer. A 
schematic illustration of both evolution through a selectionist process and evolution 
through communal exchange is provided in Figure 1. 
 
Table 1. Similarities and differences between two evolutionary frameworks: natural 
selection and communal exchange. From (Gabora, 2013). 
 Natural Selection Communal Exchange 
Unit of self-replication DNA Autopoietic network 
Mechanism for 
preserving continuity 
DNA replication; 
proofreading enzymes, etc. 
Retention of horizontally 
transmitted information 
Mechanism for 
generating novelty 
Mutation; recombination; 
replication errors; pseudo-
genes 
Faulty duplication of autopoietic 
structure; transmission errors; 
innovation 
Self-assembly code  Yes No 
High fidelity Yes No 
Transmission of 
acquired traits 
No Yes 
Type of process  Darwinian Lamarckian (by some standards) 
Evolutionary processes 
it seeks to explain 
Biological  Early life; horizontal gene 
transfer (HGT); cultural 
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Figure 1. Top: Schematic depiction of evolution through natural selection. Each 
individual has a genotype, represented by a small circle, and a phenotype, represented 
by a larger circle encompassing the small circle. Phenotypic change acquired over a 
lifetime, indicated by increasingly lighter color, is not passed on, as indicated by the fact 
that in lineage A the individual born in generation 2 did not inherit the lighter color the 
parent acquired by the time it had offspring. Lineage A outcompetes lineage B as 
indicated by the fact that by generation 3 there are no individuals left in lineage B. 
Evolution relies on competition amongst individuals rather than transformation of 
individuals. Bottom: Evolution through communal exchange involves the duplication and 
transformation of variants. There is no distinction between phenotype and genotype, and 
acquired characteristics are transmitted, as shown by how in lineage A, Individual 2 has 
the light color its ‘parent’ acquired over its lifetime. Death does not have the same finality 
since, given the right conditions, an inert individual could potentially reconstitute itself, as 
in Lineage B. Therefore the term ‘generations’ is not meaningful. Acquired change is 
transmitted. Communal exchange relies more on transformation of individuals than 
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competition amongst individuals. Biological evolution involves both communal exchange 
and natural selection. With respect to cultural evolution the matter is still a subject of 
discussion but many, including the author, believe it evolves solely through communal 
exchange. From (Gabora, 2013). 
 
If even biological life originally evolved through communal exchange, it seems 
reasonable that cultural evolution would get established through this simpler, more 
haphazard process (Gabora, 2000a, 2013). Adults share ideas with children such that 
eventually they develop their own self-organized network of understandings, at which 
point they can adapt ideas to their own needs and perspectives and thereby contribute 
creatively to culture. We can refer to such a web of understandings as a worldview. A 
worldview is self-regenerating: an adult shares concepts, ideas, attitudes, stories, and 
experiences with children (and other adults), influencing little by little the formation of 
other worldviews. Thus, through interactions amongst its parts, a worldview not only 
responds to perturbations, but reconstitutes itself. Each worldview takes form through the 
influence of many others, though some, such as those of relatives and teachers, may 
predominate. Children expose fragments of what was originally the adult’s worldview to 
different experiences and different bodily constraints, thereby forging unique internal 
models of the relation of self to world.  
Thus the human mind dynamically reconfigures itself to achieve a more stable 
configuration, and acts in ways that cause such reconfigurations to proliferate; it 
possesses the necessary structure for evolution through communal exchange, as 
illustrated schematically in Figure 2. The more information a mind encodes, the greater 
the variety of ways this knowledge base can be reconfigured. Its configuration is revealed 
through behavioural regularities in how it expresses itself and responds to situations, and 
in the creative outputs it generates. Note that although this process does not involve 
selection in its technical sense (i.e., change due to the effect of differential selection on 
the distribution of heritable variation across a population), selection as the term is used in 
everyday parlance may play a role (i.e., individuals may be selective about which aspects 
of their worldviews they share or assimilate). 
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Figure 2. Schematic depiction of how worldviews evolve, not through survival of the 
fittest but transformation of all. Worldviews transform as a consequence of psychological 
entropy-reducing restructuring and communal exchange. Individuals are represented by 
spheres and their internal models of the world, or worldviews, are represented by 
networks within the spheres. Patterns of social transmission are indicated by dashed 
green lines. Creative contributions to culture are indicated by wavy purple arrows from 
creator to artifact. Learning through exposure to artifacts is indicated by wavy orange 
arrows. Worldviews and patterns of social transmission tend to become more complex 
over time. Individuals such as the one with the red network are more compelled than 
others to reframe what they learn in their own terms, potentially resulting in a more 
unique or nuanced worldview. Such ‘self-made’ individuals are more likely to have an 
effect on culture (e.g., through the creation of artifacts), which may influence the 
formation of new worldviews long after they have died. This is indicated by the diffusion 
of segments from self-made individuals to other individuals, either indirectly by way of 
exposure to the Mona Lisa, or directly by way of exposure to its creator. From (Gabora, 
2013). 
 
For minds to evolve through communal exchange they must be organized such 
that, for any given concept or idea, there exists some pathway (e.g., a chain of 
associations, or deductive reasoning) by which it could potentially interact with and 
modify any other given concept or idea. The concepts and ideas must form an integrated 
whole, i.e., they must be able to interact with and modify others not just in the same local 
cluster (as in comparing one dress to another), but across clusters (as in cross-domain 
analogy). Thus, a big question is: how did the human mind acquire this kind of structure? 
Evolution of Capacity for Chaining and Redescription 
Let us first consider how the mind acquired the capacity to modify thoughts and 
ideas by thinking about them in the context of other thoughts and ideas that are similar, 
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that is, in the same local cluster. Merlin Donald (1991) suggested that the enlarged cranial 
capacity of our Homo erectus ancestors 1.7 million years ago enabled them to voluntarily 
retrieve and modify memories independent of environmental cues (sometimes referred to 
as ‘autocuing’), a capacity he referred to as self-triggered recall and rehearsal, and which 
ushered forth a transition to a new mode of cognitive functioning. Thus, while Homo 
habilis was limited to the “here and now”, Homo erectus could chain memories, 
thoughts, and actions into more complex ones, and progressively modify them, thereby 
gaining new perspectives on past or possible events, and even mime or re-enact them for 
others. The notion of self-triggered recall bears some resemblance to Hauser et al.’s 
(2002) idea that what distinguishes human cognition from that of other species is the 
capacity for recursion, and to Penn, Penn, Holyoak, and Povinelli’s (2008) concept of 
relational reinterpretation, the ability to reinterpret higher order relations between 
perceptual relations. 
Donald’s proposal has been shown to be consistent with the structure and 
dynamics of associative memory (Gabora, 2000b, 2010a). Neurons are sensitive to 
primitive stimulus attributes or ‘microfeatures’, such as sounds of a particular pitch or 
lines of a particular orientation. Experiences encoded in memory are distributed across 
cell assemblies of neurons, and each neuron participates in the encoding of many 
experiences. Memory is also content-addressable: similar stimuli activate overlapping 
distributions of neurons. With larger brains, experiences could be encoded in more detail, 
enabling a transition from coarse-grained to fine-grained memory. Fine-grained memory 
enabled concepts and ideas to be encoded in more detail, that is, there were more ways in 
which distributed sets of microfeatures could overlap. Greater overlap enabled more 
routes for self-triggered recall, and paved the way for streams of abstract thought. Ideas 
could now be reprocessed until they fit together with cognitive structures already in 
place, allowing for the emergence of local clusters of mutually consistent ideas, and thus 
for a more coherent internal model of the world, or worldview (Gabora, 1999). 
Evolution of Capacity for Cross-Domain Thinking 
At this point it was possible to think about an idea in relation to other closely 
related ideas and thereby forge clusters of mutually consistent ideas, which allowed for a 
narrow kind of creativity, limited to minor adaptations of existing ideas. But the mind 
was not integrated, nor truly creative, until it could forge connections between seemingly 
disparate ideas as in the formation of analogies. How did this come about? 
One proposal is that it was due to the onset in the Middle/Upper Paleolithic of 
contextual focus (CF): the ability to shift between different modes of thought—an explicit 
analytic mode conducive to logical problem solving, and an implicit associative mode 
conducive to insight and breaking out of a rut (Gabora, 2003). While dual processing 
theories generally attribute abstract, hypothetical thinking solely to the more recently 
evolved “deliberate” mode (e.g., Evans, 2003), according to the CF hypothesis it is 
possible in either mode but it will differ character in the two modes (flights of fancy 
versus logically constructed arguments) (Sowden, Pringle, & Gabora, 2014). CF thus 
paved the way for integration of different domains of knowledge (Mithen, 1998). 
It has been proposed that CF was made possible by mutation of the FOXP2 gene, 
which is known to have undergone human-specific mutations in the Paleolithic era 
(Chrusch & Gabora, 2014; Gabora & Smith, submitted). FOXP2, once thought to be the 
“language gene”, is not uniquely associated with language. The idea is that, in its modern 
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form, FOXP2 enabled fine-tuning of the neurological mechanisms underlying the 
capacity to shift between processing modes by varying the size of the activated region of 
memory. 
Implications of Cultural Evolution Framework for Creativity  
The communal exchange theory of cultural evolution suggests a theory of 
creativity, sometimes referred to as honing theory, according to which peoples’ uniquely 
structured webs of understanding, or worldviews, are the basic units of cultural evolution. 
It is through the ‘honing’ of creative ideas that worldviews transform and evolve. In other 
words, the creative process reflects the natural tendency of a worldview to seek a state of 
dynamic equilibrium by exploring perspectives and associations until the worldview 
achieves a more stable state than it started with. A creative outcome (e.g., a painting) can 
be an external manifestation of internal cognitive restructuring brought about through 
immersion in a creative task. The creator may see and feel the world differently 
afterward, which is why creativity can be transformative, and why expressive art 
therapies are gaining prominence. Not all creative outputs involve extensive cognitive 
restructuring; some are minor variations on a theme, and others outright imitations, which 
is why a creative work cannot be fully understood outside of its cultural context. 
Computationally Modeling the Evolution of Cultural Novelty 
It is difficult to experimentally test hypotheses about how the creative abilities 
underlying cultural transitions evolved. Agent-based modeling is a computational 
methodology in which artificial agents can be used to represent interacting individuals. It 
enables us to address questions about the workings of collectives such as societies. It is 
particularly valuable for answering questions of this sort which lie at the interface 
between anthropology and psychology, owing both to (1) the difficulty of experimentally 
manipulating a variable, such as the average amount by which one invention differs from 
its predecessor and observing its impact on cumulative culture over time, and (2) the 
sparseness of the pre-modern archaeological record. Although methods for analyzing 
these remains are becoming increasingly sophisticated, they cannot always distinguish 
amongst different theories.  
EVOC (for EVOlution of Culture) is a computational modeling of cultural 
evolution that consists of neural network based agents that invent new actions and imitate 
actions performed by neighbors (Gabora, 1995, 2008b). The assemblage of ideas changes 
over time not because some replicate at the expense of others, as in natural selection, but 
through inventive and social processes. Agents can learn generalizations concerning what 
kinds of actions are useful, or have a high “fitness”, with respect to a particular goal, and 
use this acquired knowledge to modify ideas for actions before transmitting them to other 
agents. A model such as EVOC is a vast simplification, and results obtained with it may 
or may not have direct bearing on complex human societies, but it allows us to vary one 
parameter while holding others constant and thereby test hypotheses that could otherwise 
not be tested. It provides new ways of thinking about and understand what is going on.  
EVOC exhibits typical evolutionary patterns, such as (1) a cumulative increase in 
the fitness and complexity of cultural outputs over time, and (2) an increase in diversity 
as the space of possibilities is explored followed by a decrease as agents converge on the 
fittest possibilities, as illustrated in Figure 3. EVOC has been used to model how the 
mean fitness and diversity of cultural elements is affected by factors such as population 
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size and density, and borders that affect transmission between populations, as well as the 
questions reported here pertaining to creativity. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The typical increase in fitness of cultural outputs over time (top) and increase in 
diversity as the space of possibilities is being explored followed by a decline as the 
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society converges on the fittest (bottom). These graphs also demonstrate the effect on 
fitness and diversity an open-ended space of possibilities. 
 
Modeling Hypothesized Cognitive Breakthroughs Underlying Cultural Transitions 
Recall Donald’s hypothesis that cultural evolution was made possible by the onset 
of the capacity for one thought to trigger another, leading to the chaining and progressive 
modification of thoughts and actions (Donald, 1991). This was tested in EVOC by 
comparing runs in which agents were limited to single-step actions to runs in which they 
could chain ideas together to generate multi-step actions (Gabora, Chia, & Firouzi, 2013). 
As illustrated in Figure 4, chaining increased the mean fitness and diversity of cultural 
outputs across the artificial society (Gabora, Chia, & Firouzi, 2013). While chaining and 
no-chaining runs both converged on optimal actions, without chaining this set was static, 
but with chaining it was in constant flux as ever-fitter actions were found. While without 
chaining there was a ceiling on mean fitness of actions, with chaining there was no such 
ceiling, and chaining also enhanced the effectiveness of the ability to learn trends. These 
findings support the hypothesis that the ability to chain ideas together can transform a 
culturally static society into one characterized by open-ended novelty.  
 The hypothesis that the onset of contextual focus (CF) brought about a second 
cognitive transition underlying the human capacity to evolve complex culture was also 
tested with EVOC (Gabora, Chia, & Firouzi, 2013). When the fitness of an agent’s 
outputs was low it temporarily shifted to a more divergent mode by increasing α: the 
degree to which a newly invented idea deviates from the idea on which it was based. As 
illustrated in Figure 4, both mean fitness of actions across the society increased with CF, 
as hypothesized, and CF was particularly effective when the fitness function changed, 
which supports its hypothesized utility in breaking out of a rut and adapting to new or 
changing environments. 
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Figure 4. Mean fitness (top) and diversity (bottom) of cultural outputs across the artificial 
EVOC society with both chaining and CF, chaining only, CF only, and neither chaining 
nor CF. Data are means of 500 runs. (From Gabora & Smith, submitted.) 
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These findings show how a cultural evolutionary framework can provide a 
valuable perspective on creativity. Note however that although chaining made the variety 
of novel outputs open-ended, and this became even more pronounced with CF, these 
novel outputs were nonetheless predictable. Chaining and CF did not open up new 
cultural niches in the sense that, for example, the invention of cars created niches for the 
invention of things like seatbelts and stoplights. EVOC in its current form could not solve 
insight problems, which require restructuring the solution space. Nonetheless it is 
sufficient to illustrate the effectiveness of chaining and CF. Building on a related research 
program in concept combination (e.g., Aerts, Gabora, & Sozzo, 2013), models of 
concepts provide further support, showing that CF is conducive to making creative 
connections by placing concepts in new contexts (Gabora & Aerts 2009; Gabora & Kitto, 
2012; Veloz, Gabora, Eyjolfson, & Aerts, 2011). 
Impact of Creative Leadership on Cultural Evolution 
Throughout history there have been leaders who were imitated more frequently 
than the common person. An interesting question is: what is the impact of leadership on 
creativity and the evolution of culture?  
This question was also investigated in EVOC using the broadcasting function. 
Broadcasting allows the action of a leader to be visible to not just immediate neighbors, 
but all agents, thereby simulating the effects of media such as public performances, 
television, or the Internet, on patterns of cultural change. When broadcasting is turned on, 
each agent adds the broadcaster as a possible source of actions it can imitate. A particular 
agent can be chosen as the broadcaster before the run, or the broadcaster can be chosen at 
random, or the user can specify that the agent with the fittest action is the broadcaster. 
Broadcasting can be intermittent or continuous throughout the duration of a run.  
Broadcasting produced a modest increase in the fitness of actions, but it 
accelerates convergence on optimal actions, thereby consistently reducing diversity. This 
can be seen in Figure 5 by comparing column 1 with no leader to column 2 with one 
leader. Here we see the previously mentioned increase in diversity as the space of 
possibilities is explored followed by a decrease as agents converge on the fittest 
possibilities. The total number of different actions after 20 iterations decreases from eight 
to five when a leader is introduced, and the percentage of agents executing the most 
popular action increases from 41\% to 84\%. Thus leadership accentuates the normal 
plummet in diversity. 
Figure 5 also shows the impact of a dictatorial style of leadership (one 
broadcaster) versus a more distributed style of leadership (multiple leaders). As we go 
from one leader to five leaders the total number of different actions after 20 iterations 
increases from five to nine, and the percentage of agents executing the most popular 
action decreases from 84\% to 31\%. Thus, the leadership induced decrease in diversity is 
mitigated by a more distributed leadership. 
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Figure 5. Diversity of actions over a run with 0, 1, and 5 broadcasters. Different actions 
are represented by differently coloured cells. In all cases there is an increase followed by 
a decrease in diversity over time (moving down any column from the first iteration at the 
top to the 20th at the bottom) but this becomes less pronounced with additional leaders. 
In these experiments broadcasters were chosen at random in every iteration, and when 
there were multiple broadcasters available to imitate, agents selected the broadcaster 
whose action was most similar to their own. (Adapted from Gabora, 2008b.) 
 
The effectiveness of creative versus uncreative styles of leadership was also 
investigated. Creative leadership increased the mean fitness of cultural outputs only when 
non-leaders were relatively uncreative, and increased the diversity of outputs only early 
in a run during initial exploration of the space of possibilities (Leijnen & Gabora, 2010). 
Balancing Creativity with Continuity 
Cultural evolution, like any evolutionary process, requires a balance of change 
and continuity. While creative individuals generate the novelty that fuels cultural 
evolution, absorption in their creative process impedes the diffusion of proven solutions, 
effectively rupturing the fabric of society. Thus, it was hypothesized that a society in 
which creative (novelty injecting) individuals are interposed with imitating (continuity 
maintaining) individuals ensures both that new ideas come about and that, if effective, 
they are not easily lost by society as a whole. This hypothesis was tested in EVOC in a 
set of three experiments. 
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Varying the Ratio of Inventing to Imitating 
To investigate the optimal ratio of inventing to imitating, the invention-to-
imitation ratio was systematically varied from 0 to 1. When agents never invented, there 
was nothing to imitate, and there was no cultural evolution at all. If the ratio of invention 
to imitation was even marginally greater than 0, not only was cumulative cultural 
evolution possible, but eventually all agents converged on optimal cultural outputs. When 
all agents always invented and never imitated, the mean fitness of cultural outputs was 
also sub-optimal because fit ideas were not dispersing through society. The society as a 
whole performed optimally when there was a mixture of inventing and imitating, with the 
optimal ratio of the two being approximately 1:1, with the exact value depending on the 
difficulty of the fitness function; for example, with the difficult fitness function shown in 
Figure 6, it was significantly lower than 1:1. This showed that, as in biological evolution, 
culture evolves most efficiently when the novelty-generating process of creativity is 
tempered with the continuity fostering process of imitation. 
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Figure 6. Fitness (top) and diversity (bottom) of cultural outputs with different ratios of 
inventing to imitating. 
Varying the Ratio of Creators to Conformers 
The finding that very high levels of creativity can be detrimental for society led to 
the hypothesis that there is an adaptive value to society’s ambivalent attitude toward 
creativity; society as a whole may benefit from a distinction between the conventional 
workforce and what has been called a ‘creative class’ (Florida, 2002). This was 
investigated by introducing two types of agents: conformers that only obtained new 
actions by imitating and creators that obtained new actions either by inventing or 
imitating (Gabora & Firouzi, 2012). A given agent was either a creator or an imitator 
throughout the entire run, and whether a given creator invented or imitated in a given 
iteration fluctuated stochastically. We could systematically vary C, the proportion of 
creators to imitators in the society, and p, how creative the creators were. As illustrated in 
Figure 7, we observed a tradeoff between C and p thus providing further evidence that 
society as a whole functions optimally when creativity is tempered with continuity. 
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Figure 7. The effect of varying the percentage of creators, C, and how creative they are, 
p, on the mean fitness of ideas in EVOC. 3D graph (left) and contour plot (right) for the 
average mean fitness for different values of C and p using discounting to ensure that the 
present value of any given benefit with respect to idea fitness diminishes as a function of 
elapsed time before that benefit is realized. The z-axis is reversed to obtain an 
unobstructed view of surface; therefore, lower values indicate higher mean fitness. The 
red line in the contour plot shows the position of a clear ridge in fitness landscape 
indicating optimal values of C and p that are sub-maximal for most {C, p} settings, i.e., a 
tradeoff between how many creators there are and how creative they should be. The 
results suggest that excess creativity at the individual level can be detrimental at the 
level of the society because creators invest in unproven ideas at the expense of 
propagating proven ideas. The same pattern of results was obtained analyzing just one 
point in time and using a different discounting method (not shown). (Adapted from 
Gabora, & Firouzi, 2012.) 
 
Social Regulation of How Creative People Are 
We then hypothesized that society as a whole might perform even better with the 
ability to adjust creativity in accordance with their perceived creative success, through 
mechanisms such as selective ostracization of deviant behavior unless accompanied by 
the generation of valuable cultural novelty, and encouraging of successful creators. A 
first step in investigating this was to determine whether it is algorithmically possible to 
increase the mean fitness of ideas in a society by enabling them to self-regulate how 
creative they are. To test the hypothesis that the mean fitness of cultural outputs across 
society increases faster with social regulation (SR) than without it, we increased the 
relative frequency of invention for agents that generated superior ideas, and decreased it 
for agents that generated inferior ideas (Gabora & Tseng, 2014). Thus when SR was on, 
if relative fitness was high the agent invented more, and if it was low the agent imitated 
more. p(C) was initialized at 0.5 for both SR and non-SR societies. 
When social regulation was introduced into the artificial society, the mean fitness 
of the cultural outputs was higher, as shown in Figure 8. The typical pattern was 
observed with respect to diversity, or number of different ideas: an increase in diversity 
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as the space of possibilities is explored followed by a decrease as agents converge on fit 
actions. However, this pattern occurred earlier, and was more pronounced, in societies 
with SR than societies without it. 
 
   
 
Figure 8. Mean fitness (left) and diversity (right) of cultural outputs across all agents over 
the duration of the run with and without social regulation. Data are averages across 250 
runs. (From Gabora & Tseng, 2014). 
 
As illustrated in Figure 9, societies with SR ended up separating into two distinct 
groups: one that primarily invented, and one that primarily imitated. Thus, the observed 
increase in fitness can indeed be attributed to increasingly pronounced individual 
differences in their degree of creative expression over the course of a run. Agents that 
generated superior cultural outputs had more opportunity to do so, while agents that 
generated inferior cultural outputs became more likely to propagate proven effective 
ideas rather than reinvent the wheel. 
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Figure 9. At the beginning of the run all agents created and imitated with equal 
probability. Midway through their p(C) values were distributed along the range from 0 to 
1. By iteration 60 they had segregated into two distinct groups: conformers (with p(C) 
from 0 to 0.1) and creators (with p(C) from 0.9 to 1). (From Gabora & Tseng, 2014). 
Documenting Our Cultural Ancestry 
The application of phylogenetic techniques derived from Darwinian approaches to 
culture present a distorted picture of cultural history as branching rather than network-
like, because they do not incorporate horizontal transmission and blending. Also, because 
they incorporate only measurable attributes, they do not capture relatedness that resides at 
the conceptual level (e.g., mortars and pestles are highly related despite little similarity at 
the attribute level). To deal with this, the communal exchange theory of culture inspired a 
new technique for chronicling material cultural history, which has been used on multiple 
data sets. This method has been shown to generate a pattern of cultural ancestry that is 
more congruent with geographical distribution and temporal data than that obtained with 
phylogenetic approaches (Gabora, Leijnen, Veloz, & Lipo, 2011; Veloz, Tempkin, & 
Gabora, 2012). An example of a small set of data in Figure 10 shows how the communal 
exchange representation is web-like—it allows for not just vertical but also horizontal 
lines of descent—not branching, as would be imposed on it by a phylogenetic 
representation, which allows for only vertical lines of descent. 
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Figure 10. Similarity graphs based on conceptual network analysis of Baltic psalteries (a 
kind of stringed musical instrument) under different perspective weighting schemes. By 
incorporating not just physical characteristics but also conceptual attributes (such as 
those pertaining to sacred symbolic imagery), and weighting them differently, it was 
possible to resolve ambiguities obtained with the phylogenetic approach, and generated 
a lineage more consistent with other historical data. (A) Physical attributes only (B) 
Symbolism (C) Physical attributes and Symbolism (equal weights) (D) Physical attributes 
(25% weight) and Symbolism (75% weight). Each node corresponds to a single artifact. 
Node shapes indicate ethnolinguistic groups: Slavic (circle), Finnic (hexagon), and Baltic 
(square). Shaded nodes designate archaeological instruments (10-13 cc); remaining 
nodes correspond to ethnographical instruments (17-20 cc). (From Veloz, Tempkin, & 
Gabora, 2012). 
Understanding Creative Works in their Cultural Context 
We now examine studies with real humans that explore in various ways the 
interplay between creativity and the cultural milieu. 
Cross-domain Recognizability of Creative ‘Essence’ 
To what extent is a creative idea an abstract Platonic essence, and to what extent 
is it something that could only emerge from within the constraints of a specific domain? 
This question has implications for the evolution of culture, because the greater the extent 
to which ideas are not tied to their manifestation in any particular domain, the greater the 
extent to which creative novelty can reflect influences from diverse sources. 
In a study that set out to investigate this empirically, it was demonstrated that 
when pieces of music were re-interpreted as paintings, naïve participants were able to 
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correctly identify at significantly above chance which piece of music inspired which 
painting (Ranjan, Gabora, & O’Connor, 2014; Ranjan, 2014). Although the medium of 
expression is different, something of its essence remains sufficiently intact for an 
observer to detect a resemblance between the new work and the source that inspired it. 
This result lent empirical support to the largely anecdotal body of evidence that cross-
domain influence is a genuine phenomenon, and suggested that, at their core, creative 
ideas are less domain-dependent than is generally assumed. It did not, however, provide 
evidence that the phenomenon extends beyond the artificial conditions of such a study, 
nor did it give an indication of how prevalent it is. 
Cross-Domain Influences on Innovation 
Who or what influenced your creative output? Anecdotal reports and case studies 
(e.g., Feinstein, 2006) are one method of getting answers to this question. However, we 
are exposed to so many different people and objects in our lives that we may not be 
completely conscious of who or what influences our creative outputs. We are just 
beginning to be able to corroborate anecdotal reports with machine learning techniques 
designed to resolving lines of influence (Saleh, Abe, & Elgammal, 2014). These 
techniques are not yet able to discern cross-domain influences, wherein a creator in one 
domain (e.g., artist) is influenced by another domain (e.g., music). 
Because Darwinian theories assume strictly vertical transmission and do not allow 
different “species” of cultural artifacts to “mate”, they are incompatible with cross-
domain influence. Communal exchange theory predicts that cross-domain influence is not 
just present but fuels cultural innovation. In a project designed to test between these 
predictions, 66 creative individuals in a variety of disciplines were asked to list as many 
influences on their creative work as they could (Gabora & Carbert, 2015). Results suggest 
that cross-domain influences are in fact more widespread than within-domain influences, 
even when broad within-domain influences (e.g., technology influenced by music) as 
well as narrow within-domain influences (e.g., music influenced by other music) are 
taken into account. 
 
Table 2: Percentage of cross-domain (CD), within-domain narrow (WD-n), within-domain 
broad (WD-b), and uncertain (U) influences. From (Gabora & Carbert, 2015). 
 
 CD WD-n WD-b U 
% of Total 47% 27% 8% 18% 
 
Cross-domain Recognizability of Creative Style 
If creative output reflects not just chance or expertise but the idiosyncratic process 
of wrestling with personally meaningful issues to forge an integrated worldview, one 
might expect that creative individuals may have a characteristic style or ‘voice’, a 
distinctive facet of their personality that is recognizable not just within domains but 
across domains. Empirical support has been obtained for this prediction (Gabora, 2010b; 
Gabora, O’Connor, & Ranjan, 2012; Ranjan, 2014). Art students were able to identify at 
significantly above-chance levels which famous artists created pieces of art they had not 
seen before. They also identified at significantly above-chance levels which of their 
classmates created pieces of art they had not seen before. More surprisingly, art students 
also identified the creators of non-painting artworks that they had not seen before. 
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Similarly, creative writing students were able to identify at significantly above-chance 
levels passages of text written by famous writers that they had not encountered before 
and passages of text written by their classmates that they had not encountered before. 
Perhaps most surprising of all, creative writing students also identified at significantly 
above-chance levels which of their classmates created a work of art, that is, a creative 
work in a domain other than writing.  
Creativity is sometimes thought to be “domain-specific” because expertise or 
eminence in one creative endeavor is rarely associated with expertise or eminence in 
another (Baer, 1996; Tardif & Sternberg, 1988). Although polymaths exist, famously 
creative scientists are rarely famously creative artists. The results of these studies support 
the view that creative achievement can be characterized in terms of, not just expertise or 
eminence, but the ability to express what we genuinely are through whatever media we 
have at our disposal. When looked at this way, creativity does appear to be more domain-
general than it has been thought to be. 
Applications of Research on the Cultural Evolution of Creativity 
Finally, let us briefly mention how research on creativity in a cultural context is 
being used to model one kind of cognitive process by which people find creative 
solutions to practical problems: exaptation. The concept of exaptation comes from 
biology where it refers to the situation wherein a trait that originally came about to solve 
one problem is co-opted for another use. Exaptation has been shown to play a pivotal role 
in economics (Dew, Sarasvathy, & Ventakaraman, 2004), and a preliminary attempt has 
been made to develop a mathematical model of exaptation that can be applied across 
disciplines (Gabora, Scott, & Kauffman, 2013). Applied to culture it refers to the 
situation wherein a different context suggests a new use for an existing item. The 
approach provides a formal model of what Rothberg (2015) calls Janusian thinking, 
which involves achieving a creative outcome by looking at something from a different 
perspective. Waste recycling is an interesting form of cross-domain creative influence 
because of its applications to sustainability efforts. An item that is a wasteful byproduct 
in one context is found to be useful in a different context. The approach has been used to 
model the creative restructuring of a concept in a new context when it is considered from 
another perspective (Gabora & Carbert, 2015). A similar approach can be taken to data 
transformation, in which data in one format is changed to a different format while 
preserving the content so that it can be put to a different purpose or made easier to 
interpret or understand (as in the visualization of astronomical data).  
Conclusions 
To understand how culture evolves one must understand the creative processes 
that fuel cultural innovation. This chapter provided an overview of ways in which 
creativity and cultural evolution interact, and ways in which theoretical investigations and 
empirical studies of both can mutually inform one another. The chapter merely touches 
the tip of the iceberg of this fascinating topic. It will be exciting to see what the coming 
decade brings as we move ahead on the exciting journey toward understanding the 
lineages of creative influence that result in not just the artistic masterpieces that inspire us 
and the technological achievements that connect us, but the ideas, gadgets, and jokes we 
encounter each day that make life simpler or just make us smile. 
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